In spite of these shortcomings, this book delivers a redemptive view of time and
eternity that will stimulate theologicalreflection. Specialists will find much to discuss and
debate, while all will appreciate the moments of profound insight in the conclusion.
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Roger Williams, in modem times, has been alienated from the Reformed tradition and
fashioned into a secular libertarian fighting the Puritanical influences of colonial America.
Although living a century prior to the Bill of Rghts, he has been molded into aJeffersonian
democrat. It has been forgotten that this voice in the wilderness for relqqous liberty was a
separatist who had a dogma as personal and vehement as any other New Englander of his
time. As many already know, Williams did promulgate freedom of conscience. However,
James Calvin Davis in The MoralTbeobgofRoger Wifiwnspointsout that this political theory
arose out of the same Reformed tradition that the Massachusetts brethren used to stifle
liberties. Williams, and those influenced by him,saw himself more as a John Calvin than
a James Madison. A restoration of this Reformed portrait is what Davis of Middlebury
College, Vermont, exhumes for us. The MoralTbeohg, which began as a dissertationunder
ethicist James F. Childress, is an exploration of Williams's synthesis between private
Christian conviction and public ethics.
How is it possible that a theological particularist could preach and live the values
of a liberal universalist? The MoralTheologyproposes an alternative found in the scant yet
potent writings of Williams. Davis believes-after rummaging through the archaic
English-that Wdhams saw in the Christian moral tradition, particularly Calvinism, "the
theological resources necessary to explore bases of morality shared with people outside
the faith communitya' (xiv).
The Moral Theology of Roger Williams is not a biography; nor is it intended to be
chronological. Theological ethics is the focus of this work, and it is organized thus. Part
1 develops the narrative of Williams's association with the Puritans in the Old World
and the reasons for his subsequent immigration to the New. The sectarian hostility
characteristic of the reign of James I placed a separatist imprint upon young Roger. His
separatism was not evident at fust. In fact, Williams had the good fortune to serve under
Sir Edward Coke, the foremost legal mind of England at the time, who would become
an influence upon the early Federalists. Already at an early age, Williams was fusing
morality and public ethics.
Davis briefly outlines the well-known story of Williams's eventual departure for his
new home in the nascent New England colonies. However, this proponent of religious
freedom was unable to be cordial to his fellow Puritans. He was intolerant toward the
fallacies in relqgon and government that the Puritan leaders were committing in their
settlements. After involuntarily (or at times out of his own volition) moving to a number
of established colonies, he was forced to found Providence, Rhode Island.
Rhode Island would become a haven for separatists, dissenters, agnostics, and
pagans alike. The liberties that Williams espoused arose out of his correspondence with
John Cotton, the spokesman for relqgous compulsion, for which New England would
become known. Anticipating James Madison's views against religious assessments,
Williams outlined for Cotton that religious compulsion was counterproductive to civil
peace as well as evidently contrary to the gospel. Drawing from the same Reformed

tradition as the Puritans he debated, he forcefully demurred that persecution brought
the peace and unity Christianity sought. Instead, he referred cogently to Scripture,
history, and Calvinist theologians to show that a marriage of church and state spawns
instability. He proposed that belief could only be cultivated through logical persuasion,
experience, and divine compulsion (he branded human compulsion as "soul rape"). These
views were f ~ sand
t foremost drawn from a reltgtous well, and only afterwards applied
to a secular context. The political fuebrand that he wasn't is a caricature invented later.
Although Williams considered himself primarily a Reformed theologian, does this
necessarily mean that we have to view him as such? Davis believes that the subsequent
political takeover and application of Williams's views does not give us the right to see
him as anything except a Reformed theologian.
Anyone viewing Williams through political spectacles or seeing a dichotomy
between particularism and universalism will be challenged at how it is possible to even
consider a person with strong relqgous convictions as engaging in public ethics.
Although the practical applications are nondescript, Davis does give a fine presentation
of the theoretical possibility of such a combination happening.
What was the theology that led Williams to theories of conscience and toleration?
Accordmg to Davis, not only was he interpreting the Reformed texts differently than
other Puritans, he was also applying a different hermeneutic to the Scriptures. His use
of typology would be seen in his incarnational theology. In his debatingwith Cotton and
the Quakers, one can see Williams's christological perspective applied to public ethics.
He believed the first advent of Christ to be a moment of cataclysmic consequences to
the old covenant with Israel. His particular view of dispensational typology undercut the
Puritan endeavors toward a "city on a hill." The new Israel has a different relationship
that does not incorporate civil government. The civil government's position would be
to prevent violence and protect liberties. The "holy commonwealth" of New England
has, in Williams's incarnational theology, no vahdity according to Scripture.
Is it possible for one man to see the theory, application, and preservation of civil
liberties just from Scripture and tradition? Williams may have prided himself on his
exegetical prowess (however polemical he could be), but Davis reminds us that he was
undoubtedly influenced by his experience. This is the subject of part 2, which centers
upon Williams's anthropology. One notable relationship that led Williams to a belief in
the freedom of conscience was with the Native Americans. He was not a prolific nor
pithy writer, but his A K g into the Language 4America would be the epitome of his ethical
views. Throughout his life he served as a mediator between his friends, the
Narrangansett Indians, and the snobbish colonists. King Philip's War between the
English invaders and the Americans convinced this Reformed theologian that these
pagan Americans were human beings capable of morality. Thus they were worthy of the
same rights of conscience as Christians. The seeds for public conversation were sown.
Davis shows that, in what would appear to be a grammar text, A K y contains the belief
that the Native Americans were actually superior to the Europeans in morality.
It is almost unbelievable that a separatist, thrown out of settlements due to
dogmatic views, would be able to accept and incorporate "pagans" into his worldview.
The mystery that Davis poses is that if "separatism, then, breeds a spirit of intolerance,
we might expect the extreme sectarian Williams to outdo his fellow Puritans" (52), yet
Williams is an alternative to Christian particularists and strict universalists. The dogmatic
right and libertarian left join hands in the person of Williams.
Williams saw natural law and reason as a basis for public conversation and
cooperation. Pointing back to Calvin, he preached that the moral law (ie., the Decalogue)
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is written upon every heart. Citing Tertullian, he argued that relgtous persecution deprives
individuals of the rights of conscience that are inherently universal. This becomes the basis
for toleration,which leads to peaceful social coexistence. The tripod of Williams's argument
is constructed of "Relqpon, Reason, and Experience" (68).
Politically, Davis presents Williams as a minimalist. Neither ecclesiological nor
political leaders ought to have too much control over what nature has given man in the
form of conscience. There is to be some legal intrusion, though, due to the existence of
sin and the weakness of the will. However, one does not need to be religous to be
moral. In fact, pointing to history, it is often the case that r e b o u s people are immoral.
Williams argued that "Kingdomes and Governments in the World have long and long
enjoyed civill peace and quiet," without "the very name of Jesus Christ amongst them"
(97). Morality is already a part of man's nature and is accessible to all: Christian, Jew,
Muslim, pagan, and others.
Not only is rehgious compulsion in opposition to the gospel and natural law, it is
also against common civility-virtues such as justice and courtesy. The third and final
section of Davis's book discusses how Williams's theology and anthropology then led
him to his well-known views upon public discourse. Williams believed civility, not
Christianityor religious compulsion, will preserve social peace. What surprised Williams
most was that his brethren, formerly oppressed in England, would fight just as
vehemently to deny that religious freedom to others in the New World. This
transgressed the civil code of justice, in Williams's thinking. One can deny the gospel
without destroying elements of private and philosophical discussion. Denying the code
of civility, on the other hand, has social ramifications that can destroy peaceful
coexistence. Williams's debates with the seventeenth-century Quakers (as opposed to
later Quakers) revealed their lack of civility, especially courtesy. He was disgusted with
them not so much because of their theology, but because of theit rejection of common
civility. This is why Williams is remembered as a Jeffersonian democrat today rather than
a Reformed theologian. Williams, contrary to a modem view by sociologist Robert
Bellah, was concerned with the public good over private interest. In spite of his own
views of himself, his public ethics on civility would gain him the reputation of the early
prophet of the First Amendment. Historians today see him as an espouser of secular
liberties. But how would he have us see him? He would prefer to be remembered, as
Davis loyally portrays him, as a Reformed theologian, who built a community of
toleration and civility based upon Scripture and natural law.
How we remember him is not as important as how we apply him. Although
promising to show "how Christians can do the same in a contemporary setting," The
Moral Theology fails the reader in this area. Williams was, Davis reveals, a man who
combined Christian conviction with public ethics. The application of civility is the
practical example from Williams's life. Yet this civility was more prevalent among the
Native Americans than the Christian Europeans. In stressing civility, it appears that
Davis is undercutting Christian particularism. However, the practice of civility is a guide
for the common man. Williams was not a plebeian; he was a political leader. How does
a political leader meet such challenges? This is an area Davis does not address and is
perhaps to be reserved for another context. The Moral Theology does outline the
theoretical foundation for social cohesiveness in a pluralistic societyand then encourages
its vigorous pursuit today. Williams lived, and Davis shows, the divine maxim: "The
world will know you are my disciples if you have love for one another."
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